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School Choice in Suburbia:
Test Scores, Race, and Housing Markets
JACK DOUGHERTY, JEFFREY HARRELSON, LAURA MALONEY,
DREW MURPHY, RUSSELL SMITH, MICHAEL SNOW, and
DIANE ZANNONI
Trinity College
Home buyers exercise school choice when shopping for a private residence due
to its location in a public school district or attendance area. In this quantitative
study of one Connecticut suburban district, we measure the effect of elementary
school test scores and racial composition on home buyers’ willingness to purchase
single-family homes over a 10-year period, controlling for house and neighborhood characteristics. Overall, while both test scores and race explain home prices,
we found that the influence of tests declined while race became nearly seven
times more influential over our decade-long period of study. Our interpretation
of the results draws on the shifting context of school accountability, the Internet,
and racial dynamics in this suburb over time.

Introduction
While most school choice research focuses on relatively new charter and
voucher programs in urban areas, this study examines one of the nation’s
oldest and largest choice systems: the willingness to pay for better public
schools through the private real estate markets of suburbia. Using econometric and spatial analysis methods, our study asked three questions. First,
how much more were suburban home buyers willing to pay to live on the
higher-scoring side of an elementary school attendance line, when controlling
for house and neighborhood characteristics? Second, to what extent did
school racial composition influence home buyers’ willingness to pay? Third,
how has the relationship between test scores, race, and house prices changed
over the past decade, given the increasing accessibility of school-level data
on the Internet?
As Sandra Black (1999) has noted, most prior research on the relationship
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American Journal of Education 115 (August 2009)
䉷 2009 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0195-6744/2009/11504-0003$10.00

AUGUST 2009

523

School Choice in Suburbia
between school quality and home price has used a standard hedonic price
model, which does not adequately control for neighborhoods. Since better
schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods, not controlling for neighborhood would result in an overestimation of the effect of school quality on
house price. This problem was circumvented by drawing upon Black’s method
of identifying homes in close proximity to a school attendance boundary and
defining each “neighborhood” as the cluster of homes of opposite sides of this
dividing line. By restricting geographical barriers and varying the distance
from these boundaries, we identify homes that are more likely to share the
same neighborhood characteristics.
Our findings from the suburb of West Hartford, Connecticut, indicate that
elementary school test scores are significantly and positively correlated with
single-family home prices, controlling for house characteristics, neighborhood
effects, and school racial composition. For homes located in geographically
similar neighborhoods and very close to school attendance boundaries, a 1
standard deviation increase in the number of fourth graders meeting the state
achievement test goal is associated with a 1.9 percent (or $3,824 increase) in
the price of an average home in year 2000 dollars. While we do control for
school minority composition and Black (1999) does not, our finding is similar
to her result (where a 1 standard deviation increase in test scores was associated
with a 2.1 percent increase in home prices). Furthermore, in the pre-2001
period, buyers were willing to pay $2,641 more for a 1 standard deviation
increase (12 percentage point) in test scores and $435 more for a 1 standard
deviation (13.8 percentage point) reduction in school minority composition.
In the post-2001 period, buyers were willing to pay $1,054 more for a 1
standard deviation increase in test scores and $7,468 more for a 1 standard
deviation reduction in school minority composition. Overall, these quantitative
findings clarify our understanding of suburban home buyers’ awareness of
neighborhood school characteristics. Although test scores matter, their power
has diminished over time, and the racial composition of the school has played
a dramatically more influential role in determining house prices in West Hartford in recent years.
This article represents a collaborative effort between faculty and student
coauthors at Trinity College. JACK DOUGHERTY is an associate professor
of educational studies who leads the Cities, Suburbs, and Schools project
(http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/educ/css). DIANE ZANNONI is the G. Fox and
Company Professor of Economics, and JEFFREY HARRELSON, LAURA MALONEY, DREW MURPHY, RUSSELL SMITH, and MICHAEL SNOW all began this
project as her econometrics students before receiving their undergraduate degrees in 2007.
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Literature Review
Traditional hedonic regression models estimated home prices based on their
internal characteristics (e.g., square footage, number of bedrooms, age of
home) and their location. As economists began factoring the role of public
schools into this model, they initially included district-level inputs, such as
expenditures per pupil (Oates 1969). After the mid-1970s, this variable was
replaced by school-level performance outcomes, such as standardized test
scores, which became increasingly prevalent with rising levels of state education
accountability in later decades (Brasington and Haurin 2006; Rehm and Filippova 2008). More recently, economists have explored ways of distinguishing
neighborhood effects from the relationship between school test scores and
home prices. In other words, how can we determine whether home buyers
are paying for school quality versus neighborhood quality since the two are
so closely related?
Black (1999) offered an innovative solution: the boundary fixed-effects
model. In her study of test scores and home prices in suburban Boston during
the mid-1990s, she used computer mapping techniques to identify homes
located very close to an elementary school attendance boundary (0.15 mile,
or less than 800 feet). By assigning a dummy variable to code houses on
opposite sides of this boundary line, her model captured the unobservable
neighborhood characteristics that they most likely share due to their close
proximity. In Black’s regression analysis, home prices are a function of the
observable house characteristics, the unobservable neighborhood characteristics, and school test scores. This boundary fixed-effects model has been
adopted by other economists (Figlio and Lucas 2004) and was expanded on
in Kane et al.’s (2005) study of 1990s court-mandated desegregation and
housing in Charlotte, North Carolina, with school race as an additional variable. It also has generated related lines of research in Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, though scholars in these countries note that school
attendance boundaries are not nearly as tightly linked to individual homes as
they are in the United States (Davidoff and Leigh 2008; Gibbons and Machin
2003).
Some economists have criticized Black’s boundary fixed-effects model. By
identifying narrow bands of home sales on opposite sides of a school attendance boundary, the method necessarily creates relatively small samples,
with the assumption of neighborhood continuity (Brasington and Haurin
2006). Others argue for a spatial econometric model, which could resolve
two potential problems in hedonic house price models. One problem is
spatial autoregression: home prices are not independent of one another and
living next door to several “better” homes might, by itself, raise the price
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of one’s home. If this effect exists and spatial lagging of the dependent
variable is overlooked, the regression coefficient estimates may be biased.
A second problem is spatial correlation in the error terms that, if unchecked,
may generate larger standard errors (and consequently smaller t-statistics)
than warranted (Brasington 1999; Cohen and Coughlin 2008; Gibson et al.
2005). However, as Bowen et al. (2001) observed in their study of housing
prices, explicit spatial modeling is not always required. Overall, economists
of schools and housing have not reached a methodological consensus on the
best ways to address neighborhood effects (Brasington and Haurin 2006).
Bayer et al. (2007) expanded on Black’s technique by embedding it within a
sorting model to measure the relationship between test scores and house prices
as home buyers are also sorting themselves demographically, based on preferences for same-race and same-income neighbors. This San Francisco Bay area
study raises an important conceptual distinction and attempts to separate observable neighborhood characteristics (using block-level sociodemographic data
from a restricted-access version of the 1990 Census) from unobservable neighborhood characteristics. But theoretically Bayer et al. recognize the existence
of a fundamental endogeneity problem in their model, which includes sociodemographic data from census units that could, by itself, influence the price of
the house. Furthermore, on a more pragmatic level, Bayer et al.’s approach is
limited by the fact that census block boundaries are not necessarily aligned with
school attendance boundaries and they could obtain only one-third of the latter
geography for this study. Finally, given that this study relies on one year (1990)
of decennial census data, it cannot easily address change over time.
Our study of homes and schools in suburban West Hartford, Connecticut,
builds on Black (1999) and related studies in three dimensions: test data, school
race, and change over time. First, our analysis created an annual composite
achievement score from the Connecticut Mastery Test (CMT) that most closely
resembled how prospective home buyers might have seen data reported each
year (from 1996 to 2005) in the mass media. By contrast, Black (1999) averaged
raw test scores over three different years (1988, 1990, and 1992). Kane et al.
(2005) averaged a composite test score over all available years (between
1993–99 or 1997–2001, depending on availability), based on their previous
finding that property values responded to long-run measures rather than yearto-year fluctuations (Kane et al. 2003). Furthermore, Figlio and Lucas (2004)
used Florida’s system of assigning each school a letter grade, which fluctuated
significantly from year to year, based upon a formula that included school
attendance, demographic variables, and test scores.
Our second contribution is including race in the model. Although a growing
social science literature addresses the relationship between school racial composition and residential choices (Holme 2002; Saporito and Sohoni 2006), neither Black (1999) nor Figlio and Lucas (2004) incorporated school-level racial
526
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data into their econometric models. Although Kane et al. (2005) included school
racial composition as a variable, their study of Charlotte-Mecklenberg, a southern metropolitan region under court-ordered racial desegregation during their
period of study, differed substantially from the context of our northern suburban
community, where mandated school desegregation was virtually nonexistent.
Although we did not have access to the same type of restricted census block
sociodemographic data as Bayer et al. (2007), we would not have chosen to use
them due to the theoretical and pragmatic issues noted above. In West Hartford,
where we focused on elementary school attendance zones in residential areas,
we discovered several cases where boundary lines had been drawn through the
middle of census blocks.
A third contribution in our decade-long study is our time period analysis,
where we compare the school test, race, and home price relationship during
the first half (1996–2001) to the second half (2002–5). This pre- and post2001 division is important because school-level data became more readily and
widely available to prospective home buyers through the expansion of state
education accountability politics as well as the Internet during our period of
study. In contrast to Bayer et al. (2007), since our study sought to measure
change over time from 1996 to 2005, relying on census variables from one
data point (such as 2000) would have limited our analysis.
Our study of one large Connecticut suburb shares some similarities with a
state-wide analysis of Connecticut school districts and home prices by Clapp
et al. (2008). Their model also includes annual composite CMT test scores,
school racial composition, and home sale data from 1994 to 2004. But Clapp
et al. is essentially a district-to-district study because it only compares districts
with one middle school for the entire town to simplify the spatial analysis due
to the lack of digitized school attendance zone maps. As a result, Clapp et al.
analyze Connecticut’s rural towns and smaller suburbs and omit urban areas
and larger suburbs with more than one middle school zone for potential home
buyers to choose (like West Hartford). Their fixed-effects model relies on census
tract boundaries, but these are not meaningful to home buyers in the same
way as school attendance zones. Furthermore, while Clapp et al. categorize
school districts from across Connecticut into 10 different labor market areas
to improve comparability, this step does not consider each house’s location
relative to the central city, which in the Hartford area labor market can vary
between zero and over 35 miles. By contrast, our West Hartford study focuses
on home-to-home differences within neighborhoods of one large suburb, located adjacent to a major city, to determine how much home buyers were
willing to pay to live on what they perceive as the more desirable side of an
elementary school attendance boundary, based on test scores and school racial
composition over a 10-year period.
AUGUST 2009
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Context of the Study
Our case study focuses on the suburb of West Hartford, Connecticut, and its
60,000 residents. Located adjacent to the impoverished state capital of Hartford,
West Hartford is often described as a middle- to upper-middle-class suburb,
enjoying a per capita income of $33,468 (above the Connecticut state average
of $28,700 and Hartford’s figure of $13,428, according to Census 2000). Overall,
the West Hartford Public School district enrolls over 9,000 students, with 11
elementary K–5 schools that fed students into two middle–high school zones
during our study. Previously, West Hartford had been a virtually all-white suburb,
enrolling fewer than 5 percent minority students during the 1970s. But the
proportion of African American, Hispanic, and Asian students increased steadily
during our 10-year period of study, from 24 percent in 1996 to 32 percent in
2005.1
West Hartford serves as an ideal location to explore our research questions
because residents of this suburb have been very aware of the relationship
between their public neighborhood elementary schools and the private real
estate market. In 1995, immediately before our period of study, West Hartford
citizens engaged in a heated debate over plans to redraw elementary school
attendance boundaries. Plans were motivated by efforts to relieve overcrowding
in schools located in less affluent neighborhoods and to comply with Connecticut’s racial balancing law, which required districts to maintain individual
school minority enrollments within 25 percentage points of the district average.
West Hartford parents clashed over different redistricting proposals, with some
public meetings attracting up to 500 people. At one meeting, a parent from
a more affluent neighborhood who questioned the audience asked: “How
many people moved here to West Hartford specifically because of the quality
of the neighborhood schools?” According to a local reporter, “hands shot up
around the packed floor of the town hall auditorium,” demonstrating the
intensity of the perceived link between public school quality and private residential choice (Stansbury 1995).
West Hartford eventually implemented a major redistricting plan in September 1995, which affected approximately one-quarter of the student population. These school attendance boundary lines remained virtually unchanged
over the next decade.2 Residential attendance areas determine the enrollment
for a vast majority of public school students, with only a few minor exceptions.
For example, three West Hartford elementary schools were designated as
intradistrict magnets during this period, meaning that any West Hartford
student could apply to enroll via a lottery. Furthermore, residents in these
three school attendance areas could choose to “opt out” and attend a different
elementary school in the same secondary school feeder pattern if space allowed. But, in practice, only 3 percent of West Hartford’s public elementary
528
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school students left their assigned neighborhood to enroll in an intradistrict
magnet school, and even fewer elected to “opt out” to another zone.3 In any
case, magnet school applications are subject to a lottery while neighborhood
school attendance is guaranteed when a family moves into the attendance
zone. As a result, West Hartford home owners perceive a very strong link
between their home and their designated public elementary school.
After redistricting, West Hartford elementary school students continued to
take a statewide standardized exam (the Connecticut Mastery Test, or CMT),
in a format that remained relatively consistent for one decade.4 This allowed
us to concentrate our study on an uninterrupted 10-year span of stable elementary school boundaries and test results, beginning with the first calendar
year after redistricting (1996) and ending the year before a major change in
CMT testing (2005). Interestingly, public access to school-level CMT scores
became much more accessible during this period due to the combined influence of state and federal school accountability politics and the expanded
consumer usage of the Internet. The turn of the twenty-first century serves
as a convenient midpoint for our study. During the first half of the study, test
scores for individual West Hartford elementary schools probably were seen
by a smaller proportion of home buyers. Although Connecticut required each
district to report school test results, copies typically circulated only in paper
format, issued by the superintendent’s office. A newspaper graphic with school
results appeared only once a year in the daily newspaper (often during the
busy Christmas and New Year holiday season) in the local edition delivered
only to West Hartford and nearby areas (see fig. 1).5
The World Wide Web was still in its pioneer phase during this first half of
our time period. In 1995, the Prudential Connecticut Realty company opened
its first experimental “computerized library,” located at their West Hartford
office, for potential buyers to browse photographs of homes and “information
on communities’ demographics and school systems” (Hathaway 1995). Although the Connecticut Department of Education launched its own Web site
in 1996, it did not include test score data on individual schools until late 1997
for the first generation of consumers who explored the Internet.6
After 2000, during the second half of our study period, home buyers
with computer access could easily and instantaneously view details about
local schools, whether located around the corner or across the country.
Part of the data revolution was driven by state education agencies to
comply with the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002. But nongovernmental
education advocates and private real estate interests also made significant
contributions. GreatSchools.net, founded in 1998, described itself as “the
nation’s premier provider of K–12 school information to parents” (2007). This
nonprofit organization received funding from philanthropists and advertisers,
including partnerships with several leading real estate firms. Its Web site feaAUGUST 2009
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FIG. 1.—School test scores as reported annually in the local newspaper, 1999

tures school-level test score and demographic data and claims to have reached
33 million users in 2006 (see fig. 2).

Method and Data
Hedonic price models are used when the good purchased is valued for its
characteristics or services it renders. In these models the good already purchased can be reduced to its parts, and the coefficients in a regression capture
the willingness of consumers to pay (or the implicit prices) for the different
characteristics (Rosen 1974). Applied to home purchases, hedonic regression
uses information on the home purchases made, including the price of the
home and all relevant characteristics, to identify what characteristics were
important to buyers. Therefore, in addition to school quality, both the char-

530
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FIG. 2.—School test scores as presented on the GreatSchools娂 Web site, 2007

acteristics of the house and its location are included in hedonic models
explaining house price. In general,
house price p
f (house characteristics, school quality, neighborhood characteristics).
We follow Black’s (1999) methodology and estimate the following model:

ln (house price)iab p a ⫹ X iab
b ⫹ gtestab ⫹ Kbv ⫹ eiab ,

where price iab is the sales price of house i in attendance area a in neighborhood

b, X iab
are the characteristics of the house, test ab is the elementary school test
score in attendance area a in neighborhood b, and Kb is a vector of neighborhood dummy variables that account for neighborhood characteristics
shared by houses on either side of the attendance boundary (provided to avoid
omitted variable bias).
Better schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods, and the failure
to control for neighborhood might overestimate the influence of school quality
on house prices. Given that we lack data to fully capture differences in neighborhood quality, a different approach is required. Our study relied on Black’s
method (1999), which improves upon the standard hedonic price model by
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identifying homes located very close to school attendance boundaries and
creating a dummy variable to account for neighborhood characteristics shared
by homes on opposite sides of that line. Black’s approach assumes that houses
in close proximity share more neighborhood characteristics than houses farther
apart. This methodology is preferable to using census variables to control for
neighborhood effects for three reasons. First, school attendance zones are not
necessarily aligned with census geography boundaries. Second, census data
are collected once a decade and preclude an analysis of change over time
during our study period. Finally, and most importantly, even with census
variables, the problem of omitted variable bias still remains. An alternative
methodology would be to use spatial hedonic modeling to test for spatial
effects (Brasington 1999; Brasington and Haurin 2006; Gibson et al. 2005).
To create the neighborhood dummy variables, we constructed a spatial
database to connect the location of home sales with public school attendance
zones. Using Geographic Information System (GIS) software, we linked each
home sale to the nearest attendance zone boundary line shared by two elementary schools. We eventually focused on homes located in very close proximity—within 0.15 mile (about 800 feet, or 240 meters)—of these shared school
boundary lines, as illustrated in figure 3. In West Hartford, our total sample
included 26 neighborhoods, which we define in this study as homes on opposite
sides of a common boundary line.7 A typical neighborhood consists of a pair
of elementary schools and the homes along their shared boundary, as illustrated
in figure 4. In each of these areas, homes are located so close together that we
believe them to share the same neighborhood characteristics, with one key
exception: children are zoned for two different elementary schools.
This study uses pooled cross-sectional data, independently sampled observations on house prices, house characteristics, and school quality for each year
over a 10-year period. With pooled data, observations are independently distributed over time. Therefore, standard regression techniques can be used for
estimation. Since the sample is drawn from the population at different points
in time, the relationship may change over time, which was found to be the
case between two time periods: 1996–2001 and 2002–5. Were this study based
on panel instead of pooled date, the observations would not be independently
distributed over time, and either a fixed effect or random effects estimation
technique would be required to ensure efficient coefficient estimates (Wooldridge 2009).
House price is the sale price of qualified single-family residential homes
(excluding all condominiums, duplexes, etc.) with lot sizes of at least 500 square
feet sold in West Hartford, Connecticut, between 1996 and 2005.8 In order
to compare houses sold across the time period (when the average home price
rose dramatically from approximately $150,000 to $325,000), all house prices
were deflated to year 2000 dollars by constructing an index of average single532
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FIG. 3.—West Hartford elementary school zones and home sales within 0.15 mile of boundaries,
1996–2005.

family home sales prices for each year in West Hartford. Standard measures
of housing characters were available from the West Hartford property assessor’s
database. They include the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms,
age of building at time of sale, property lot size, and internal house size.9
As a proxy for school quality, we created an annual elementary school
composite test score that most closely resembled how results from the CMT
were publicly reported in the graphics of the local newspaper. For each of the
eleven K–5 elementary schools in West Hartford, an annual test score was
calculated based on the percentage of fourth-grade students meeting the state
goal, averaged across three separate tests: reading, writing, and mathematics.10
Meeting the goal is defined as scoring at or above a level specified by the
state. Reported test scores are those most likely to influence home-buying
AUGUST 2009
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FIG. 4.—Home sales within 0.15 mile of boundary between two West Hartford elementary schools,
1996–2005.

decisions. As results from the CMT given in the fall of a year typically are
reported in the press early the following year, in this study the test score
recorded in year t is based on the CMT taken in year t ⫺ 1.
This model explores the effect of test scores from last period on house price
this period. It is reasonable to expect that families with higher socioeconomic
status may move into a neighborhood and drive up both test scores and home
prices. In this case it would be impossible to specify a causal relationship. If
our model has specified house prices in year t as a function of tests scores in
year t, then endogeneity would be a problem. But this is avoided in our model
by making house price a function of last period’s test scores.
The model in this study explores the effect of school quality on house prices,
but it limits the measure of school quality to that of the elementary school.
534
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TABLE

1

Summary Statistics of Key Variables in the Data Set of Single-Family Qualified Home
Sales, 1996–2005
Variable
Home price (in year 2000
dollars)
School test score
School minority percent
Number of bedrooms
Number of bathrooms
Age of building when sold
Lot size (square feet)
Internal size (square feet)

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

198,300
73
25
3.3
2.4
55
12,181
1,870

100,639
12
13.8
.9
.9
18
7,217
776

50,658
34
9
1
1
0
600
598

1,500,000
94
70
9
8
270
114,099
8,624

NOTE.—N p 8,736.

Home purchasers also may be willing to pay for higher-quality secondary
schools. In West Hartford there were only two middle–high school zones
during the period of this study; their attendance boundaries did not change,
and their test scores remained relatively similar during the decade. The secondary school is highly correlated with neighborhood. If both are used as
independent variables, it is not possible to isolate the effect of middle and
high school from the effect of shared neighborhood characteristics in determining house prices. If there were variation in secondary schools for a significant number of neighborhoods, one could include secondary school in the
model. Unfortunately, there are only four neighborhoods that stretch across
the secondary school attendance boundary that divides West Hartford, too
few to analyze separately in this study.
Our sample consists of 8,736 single-family home sales over a decade-long
period, each linked to its assigned elementary school and its closest attendance area border. According to the summary statistics found in table 1,
the mean home price is just below $200,000 (in year 2000 dollars) and an
average of 73 percent of fourth graders met the state goal.

Results
Geographic Restriction and Variable Distance Analysis
The purpose of defining a neighborhood is to be able to control for the
characteristics of the area around the school attendance boundary that are
AUGUST 2009
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TABLE

2

Regression Results for Geographic Restriction and Variable Distance for Houses in All
Time Periods (1996–2005)

Geographic Restriction
Set A: Natural boundaries
Set B: Natural ⫹ Transportation I
Set C: Natural ⫹ Transportation II
Set D: Natural ⫹ Transportation III

.15 Mile
from the
Boundary
(1)

.25 Mile
from the
Boundary
(2)

.0020
(4.77)
.0020
(4.34)
.0015
(3.23)
.0016
(3.50)

.0020
(5.56)
.0019
(4.94)
.0016
(3.97)
.0020
(4.71)

.35 Mile
from the
Boundary All Houses
(3)
(4)
.0018
(5.52)
.0017
(4.61)
.0013
(3.45)
.0019
(4.76)

.0015
(5.18)
.0014
(4.28)
.0010
(3.20)
.0016
(4.61)

NOTE.—Dependent variable p ln (house price). Heteroskedastic-adjusted standard errors;
t-statistics in parentheses.

shared by all houses and may affect home prices. Intuitively, the closer the
homes are to the school attendance boundary, the more neighborhood characteristics will be shared. In addition, if a major road or wooded area divides
the neighborhood, there are obvious characteristics that are not shared. Similar
to Black (1999), this study considers neighborhoods that are geographically
similar on both sides of the school attendance boundary and only includes
houses that are close to the school attendance boundaries.
The model was estimated using four increasingly restrictive geographical
criteria. The goal was to gradually eliminate neighborhoods where school
attendance boundaries were shaped by rivers, parks, and major roads since
homes divided by these geographical barriers were less likely to share neighborhood characteristics.
Set A: Natural boundaries (rivers, large green spaces such as parks and
country clubs).
Set B: Natural ⫹ Transportation boundaries I (Interstate I-84).
Set C: Natural ⫹ Transportation boundaries II (I-84 ⫹ Farmington Ave.).
Set D: Natural ⫹ Transportation boundaries III (I-84 ⫹ all four-lane major
streets).
The model was also estimated for samples of houses of varying distances
from the school attendance boundary (within 0.35 mile, 0.25 mile, and 0.15
mile), based on Black’s (1999) assumption that homes in closer proximity are
more likely to share neighborhood characteristics than homes located further
away from one another. Table 2 provides a summary of the results of estimating
536
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TABLE

3

Regression Results for Most Restrictive Geography (Set D) and Distance
within .15 Mile for Houses in All Time Periods (1996–2005)
Variable
Test score
Number of bedrooms
Number of bathrooms
(Number of bathrooms)2
Lot size (square feet)
Internal size (square feet)
Neighborhood dummys
N
R 2 (adjusted)

House Distance from Attendance Area
Boundary within .15 Mile
.0016
(3.50)
.0132
(1.56)
.2366
(7.18)
⫺.0331
(⫺4.91)
.000005
(4.38)
.0003
(15.24)
Yes
1,684
.7697

NOTE.—Dependent variable p ln (house price). Heteroskedastic-adjusted standard
errors; t-statistics in parentheses.

the model with the entire sample and with varying geographical and distance
restrictions. In all cases, the coefficient on test score is positive and significant.
In subsequent estimations and analyses, the most restrictive geography (Set
D) and distance (0.15 mile from the school attendance boundary) will be used
to increase the likelihood that differences in house price are due to school
quality and not neighborhood differences.
As the results in tables 3 and 4 below show,11 for homes located in neighborhoods geographically similar and very close to elementary school attendance boundaries (within 0.15 mile, or less than 800 feet), a 12 percentage
point increase (or a 1 standard deviation) in the number of fourth graders
meeting the state testing goal is associated with a 1.97 percent, or a $3,917,
increase in the average price of a house. Black (1999) found that a 1 standard
deviation increase in test score is associated with a 2.1 percent increase in the
average home price, or $3,948.

School Minority Percentage Analysis
Both qualitative and quantitative social scientists have argued that the racial
composition of a school significantly influences parents’ perceptions about its
AUGUST 2009

537

School Choice in Suburbia
TABLE

4

Increase in Test Scores on House Prices (Year 2000 Dollars) for
Most Restrictive Geography and Distance, within .15 Mile, for
All Time Periods (1996–2005)
Test Score Percentage Point Increase
1
6
12 (1 standard deviation)

House Price Increase
326
1,958
3,917

quality and therefore influences their home-buying decisions (Holme 2002; Saporito and Sohoni 2006). Therefore, we expanded the econometric model to
include two school characteristics: test score and racial minorities. For race, we
adopted the classification scheme of the Connecticut Department of Education:
minority students are defined as Black, Hispanic, Asian American, and American
Indian students (all of the nonwhite students). In West Hartford, the average
elementary school minority composition was 25 percent, with a wide range from
9 to 70 percent across schools during our 10-year period.
If, in addition to test score, home buyers consider the school minority
composition, then omitting race from the model would bias the coefficient on
test score. If there is a negative correlation between test score and race and
if buyers prefer schools with fewer minority children, then the coefficient on
test score would be biased upward if minority composition were excluded
from the model; that is, it would capture both the willingness to pay for higher
test scores and lower minority enrollment.
While excluding a relevant variable, such as school minority composition,
can bias the coefficients of the included variables, factoring in race can cause
another estimation problem. Since school test scores and race are highly
collinear in our sample, including both variables may result in increased standard errors of the coefficients; the coefficients will remain unbiased. It would
then appear that one or both of the collinear variables are not significant in
explaining house price. This is not the case; both test score and minority
composition are significant in explaining house price when included without
the other in the model. Both variables should be included in the model.
As table 5 illustrates, when school minority composition is included in the
model, the effect of test score on home price remains stable. For a 1 standard
deviation increase in test score, the price of a house increases by 1.93 percent,
or by $3,824, when holding minority composition constant.
The influence of race on house prices appears in table 6. For a 1 standard
deviation increase in school minority composition (13.8 percentage points),
buyers’ willingness to pay for a house falls by 0.28 percent, or $547, holding
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TABLE

5

Regression Results Excluding and Including School Minority for Houses in Most
Restrictive Geography, within .15 Mile Distance, for All Time Periods (1996–2005)
House Distance from Attendance Area Boundary
Variable
Test score

Within .15 Mile
.0016
(3.498)

School minority
Number of bedrooms
Number of bathrooms
(Number of bathrooms)2
Lot size (square feet)
Internal size (square feet)
Neighborhood dummys
N
R 2 (adjusted)

.0132
(1.558)
.2366
(7.181)
⫺.0331
(⫺4.913)
.000005
(4.379)
.0003
(15.235)
Yes
1,684
.7697

Within .15 Mile Including
School Minority
.0016
(3.302)
⫺.0002
(⫺.325)
.0132
(1.556)
.2364
(7.190)
⫺.0332
(⫺4.916)
.000005
(4.379)
.0003
(15.186)
Yes
1,684
.7697

NOTE.—Dependent variable p ln (house price). Heteroskedastic-adjusted standard errors;
t-statistics in parentheses.

test scores constant. This finding is consistent with prior research (Saporito
and Sohoni 2006) regarding the significant influence of race: when the percentage of minority students increased, home buyers were willing to pay less
to purchase a home in the elementary school attendance zone.

Test and Race over Time Period Analysis (1996–2001 vs. 2002–5)
Our 10-year data set provided us with a unique opportunity to examine the
influence of test scores and school racial composition in one suburb over time.
From 1996 to 2005, the West Hartford elementary attendance zones remained
relatively stable, as did the statewide standardized testing format. Yet, due to
the expansion of the school accountability movement and the Internet, public
access to school-level testing and racial data became more readily (and instantly) available to prospective home buyers. In addition, the West Hartford
Public Schools experienced significant racial change during this period. Across
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TABLE

6

Decrease in School Minority on House Prices (Year 2000 Dollars) Including
Test Score for Most Restrictive Geography, within .15 Mile Distance, for
All Time Periods (1996–2005)
School Minority Percentage Point Decrease
1
6.9
13.8 (1 standard deviation)

House Price Increase
40
274
547

all elementary schools combined, the percentage of minority students rose 19
percentage points (from 27 to 46 percent). But racial change varied widely
across neighborhood schools. At one end of the spectrum, some schools experienced flat (or negative) growth in the percentage of minority students,
while at the other end some schools experienced pronounced growth (up to
26 percentage points). Furthermore, in our most restrictive sample of neighborhoods, both the variation and the average size of the student racial gaps
increased between schools sharing a common border while the test score gaps
remained relatively constant over time.
Therefore, to expand our study, we sought to measure the influence of
school test scores and minority composition over the decade, which we divided
into two time periods (pre-2001 and post-2001). In light of the increased
availability and awareness of school-level data, suburban home buyers should
be more responsive to school characteristics after 2001 than before.
As tables 7 and 8 show, the effect of test score on home buyers declined
60 percent between the two periods while the effect of minority composition
rose dramatically. To live in a school zone with higher test scores, home buyers
were willing to pay $2,641 more for a 1 standard deviation increase (12
percentage points) during the pre-2001 period but only $1,054 more during
the post-2001 period. But race became much more influential over the same
time span. To live in a school zone with a lower percentage of minority
students, home buyers were willing to pay only $435 more for a 1 standard
deviation reduction (13.8 percentage points) during the pre-2001 period but
were willing to pay $7,468 more during the post-2001 period. In other words,
the racial composition of elementary schools became nearly seven times more
influential than test scores in the latter half of this study. In the previously allwhite suburb of West Hartford, home buyers demonstrated the increasing
significance of race over time rather than its decline (Massey and Denton
1993; Wilson 1978).
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TABLE

7

Regression Results for Time Period Analysis for Houses in Most Restrictive Geography,
within .15 Mile of Boundary
Variable
Test score
School minority
Number of bedrooms
Number of bathrooms
(Number of bathrooms)2
Lot size (square feet)
Internal size (square feet)
Neighborhood dummys
N
R2 (adjusted)

All Periods
(1996–2005)

First Period
(1996–2001)

Second Period
(2002–5)

.0016
(3.302)
⫺.0002
(⫺.3248)
.0132
(1.556)
.2364
(7.190)
⫺.0332
(⫺4.916)
.000005
(4.379)
.0003
(15.186)
Yes
1,684
.7697

.0011
(1.920)
⫺.0012
(⫺.1659)
.0104
(.8986)
.2533
(6.080)
⫺.0356
(⫺4.118)
.000005
(3.915)
.0003
(12.096)
Yes
995
.7580

.0004
(.3284)
⫺.0027
(⫺2.543)
.0180
(1.496)
.1867
(6.305)
⫺.0251
(⫺4.259)
.000003
(1.798)
.0003
(9.952)
Yes
689
.7964

NOTE.—Dependent variable p ln (house price). Heteroskedastic-adjusted standard errors;
t-statistics in parentheses.

Discussion
At one level, our findings confirm an emerging consensus regarding the magnitude of the relationship between test scores and home prices in different
regions of the United States. Black’s (1999) study of suburban Boston in the
mid-1990s found that, with boundary fixed-effects to control for unobservable
neighborhood characteristics, a 1 standard deviation increase in elementary
school test scores resulted in a 2.1 percent increase in house prices. Our West
Hartford study, which followed Black’s boundary fixed-effects method and also
controlled for school racial composition, produced a similar finding: a 1 standard deviation increase in elementary school test scores resulted in a 1.9
percent increase in house prices. Other comparable studies using boundary
fixed-effects methods (and additional controls for school race and/or neighborhood sociodemographics) also report that a 1 school-level standard deviation increase in test scores resulted in increased housing costs ranging from
1.4 to 2 percentage points (Bayer et al. 2007; Clapp et al. 2008; Kane et al.
2005), as summarized in table 9.12
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TABLE

8

Change in Test Scores and School Minority on House Prices (Year 2000 Dollars), for
Different Time Periods for Most Restrictive Geography, within .15 Mile Distance
Increase in House Price
First
All Periods
Period
(1996–2005) (1996–2001)
Test score percentage point increase:
1
6
12
School minority percentage point decrease:
1
6.9
13.8

Second
Period
(2002–5)

318
1,912
3,824

220
1,321
2,641

88
527
1,054

38
265
531

32
218
435

541
3734
7,468

On another level, when analyzing the school and housing relationship over
time, our study underscores an initially puzzling result: the declining influence
of standardized tests. In West Hartford, while both elementary school test
scores and race explain home buyers’ willingness to pay for a suburban home,
the impact of test scores declined while race became nearly seven times more
influential than tests over the decade. Clapp et al.’s (2008) district-level study
TABLE

9

Comparable Studies Estimating the Effect of 1 School-Level Standard Deviation
Increase in Test Scores on Housing Prices
Studies with Boundary Fixed
Effects (and Other Controls)
Black (1999)
Kane et al. (2005)
Bayer et al. (2007)
Clapp et al. (2008)
Dougherty et al. (current study)

Context
Suburban Boston, MA,
1993–95
Charlotte-Mecklenberg, NC,
1994–2001
San Francisco Bay area, CA,
1992–96
Connecticut towns,
1994–2004
West Hartford, CT,
1996–2005

NOTE.—See the individual studies for details and other controls.
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Percentage Point
Increase in
Housing Prices
2.1
2
1.8
1.4
1.9
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of much of the state during the same period also reported that “in general,
we find that people in the state of Connecticut seem to be more concerned
about the changes in demographic attributes, particularly percent Hispanic
students, than the changes in test scores when deciding how much to pay for
homes” (463). However, in their cross-time analysis, Clapp et al. detected
trends in the opposite direction from ours, with the declining influence of
Hispanic students and the increasing importance of test scores on house prices
over time. Comparing these results raises new questions and also suggests
some possible interpretations.
First, in our West Hartford study, why did school race become more influential over time compared to Clapp et al.’s (2008) finding that it became less
influential elsewhere in Connecticut? Interestingly, the percentage of minority
elementary students in West Hartford increased steadily during the 10-year
span, and there was no sudden leap in the district during the second period.
But while the test score gaps between schools in our most restrictive sample
stayed relatively constant during our study period, the racial composition gaps
between schools on opposite sides of the same boundary became more pronounced over time.
Paying closer attention to the local politics of race helps to interpret these
results. During the 1995 redistricting battle, before our study period began,
there was a heightened awareness of race inside West Hartford amid charges
that the district had violated Connecticut’s racial imbalance law. But when
the controversial decision to redraw those lines was made, suburban leaders
persuaded the state legislature to suspend the racial imbalance law for a twoyear review period. Meanwhile, a 1996 state supreme court ruling in the Sheff
vs. O’Neill metropolitan desegregation case diverted attention to race outside
of West Hartford as many suburbanites wondered whether their district would
be merged in some way with the city schools. From 1996 to 2000, the local
newspaper ran several news stories comparing Hartford’s plight with those of
nearby suburbs, but it does not appear to have run a single article about the
increasing racial imbalance between schools in West Hartford. However, all
of this changed again in 2000, with a renewed emphasis on race inside the
suburb, as the state racial imbalance law was renewed and questions also
surfaced about the West Hartford’s racial achievement gap. Candidates for
the school board began to speak openly about internal racial issues as their
central concern, bolstered by headlines in the local press proclaiming, “Racial
Balance in Schools Is Campaign Issue” (Moreau 2005). Clearly, racial differences inside West Hartford’s public schools became a more publicized issue
in the latter half of the study period, which may help to explain its growing
influence. Clapp et al. (2008) suggest that Connecticut residents may make
judgments about school quality using the most readily available signals in their
minds, and in West Hartford the racial composition of a school may have
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become more salient over time due to the changing local demographic and
political contexts.
Second, given that school data accessibility increased with the Internet, and
if we assume that home buyers actually read these data, then why did test
scores not become more influential over time in West Hartford? Indeed, this
econometric model rests on a key assumption, that is, that school data are
processed in some way by home buyers. Based on a parallel study of doorto-door interviews with 89 recent home buyers in West Hartford (Ramsay et
al. 2006), we know that fewer than 35 percent of those with (or expecting)
children reported “researching” schools by examining test scores or Strategic
School Profiles or by visiting schools in person. By contrast, over 50 percent
relied primarily upon social networks of family, friends, and coworkers for
school quality information (see related findings in Holme [2002]). Yet these
interviews do not necessarily conflict with the assumption behind our econometric model. Using the vocabulary of Malcolm Gladwell (2000), as long as
a sufficient number of “market mavens” and “connectors” spread the word
about school quality to their broader social networks, then most consumers
may still act on school data, though indirectly. In fact, it is possible that the
expansion of the Internet may amplify the roles played by key individuals—
such as real estate agents—in this social networking process.
Yet we must be careful not to confuse what home buyers report in a survey
versus their actual school choice behavior. In an innovative study by Buckley
and Schneider (2007), researchers constructed a public school choice informational Web site in Washington, DC, and then monitored parents’ online
search behaviors, based on the assumption that these behaviors would reveal
more about their true preferences than surveys. The sample of users was not
representative of the city; college-educated parents were more likely to visit
the Web site than other parents. Overall, the authors found “a strong bias
toward accessing the demographic characteristics of the student population”
on the Web site, in contrast to questionnaire-based studies where parents claim
to be more interested in academic quality. Furthermore, as parents progressed
through their Web searches, they tended to focus on schools with lower percentages of black students, revealing their racial preferences for whiter schools
(Buckley and Schneider 2007, 127, 133).
These findings may help us to interpret our econometric results from suburban West Hartford. First, parents do not view data equally; those who do
access school data Web sites may be more highly educated and possibly may
have more influence through expanded social networks. Second, not all data
are equal in the eyes of parents. Although our findings show that West Hartford
home buyers were sensitive to both test scores and school racial composition,
the latter had nearly seven times more influence during the post-2001 period.
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Although the Internet is praised for offering more academic quality indicators—such as test scores—for making “smarter” school choices, we cannot
ignore the fact that many parents are using this resource to look more closely—
with racial biases—at their children’s future classmates.

Conclusion
What are the broader implications of the growing body of literature that shows,
in general, a measurable relationship between public school characteristics and
private home sales prices? Interestingly, while academic researchers often bemoan their lack of influence on general audiences, that is not necessarily the
case here. Dozens of news stories have appeared on the relationship between
public school quality and private housing markets. The CEOs of school rating
and home price Web sites have publicly demonstrated correlations between
school performance and housing appreciation, while journalists have reported
on home hunters in California using Excel spreadsheets with test score and
home price indexes drawn directly from state databases (Gardner 2005; Max
2004). In fact, the National Association of Realtors produced a Public Education
Toolkit to translate research findings by economists Sandra Black, Thomas Kane,
and David Brasington for its real estate agents and to document what the
organization refers to as the “direct link between good neighborhood schools
and good neighborhood real estate markets” (Everett et al. 2005, 3).
But for advocates of educational equity these findings are much more troubling. First, it serves as evidence of yet another form of unjust privilege as access
to more desirable public schools is viewed more like a commodity—rather than
a democratic right—to be readily bought and sold within the private housing
market. While this linkage between public schools and private homes is not new,
researchers have developed better tools with which to measure and demonstrate
its existence and perhaps growing influence. Second, the race-based findings
also question the wisdom of extending government-sponsored school choice to
urban families through public charter and magnet schools or private school
vouchers. Many of these choice programs are politically justified on the logic
that lower-income urban families deserve the same degree of school choice that
middle-class home buyers currently enjoy through the suburban housing market.
As one Hartford news columnist, criticizing the lack of public and private school
choice in the state, explained: “Of course, if you have the money, Connecticut
has ‘school choice.’ It’s called a suburb” (Cohen 2005). But if further studies
continue to show that suburban home buyers are motivated more by racial
preferences than by higher test scores, then it may call into question the underlying premise for expanding school choice.
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Notes
We appreciate comments we received on earlier drafts from Sandra Black, Jeffrey
Cohen, Ed McKenna, Salvatore Saporito, Rachael Barlow, our audiences in West
Hartford and at the American Educational Research Association in 2007, and three
anonymous reviewers. This project would not have been possible without data provided
by the Town of West Hartford and ArcGIS support from David Tatem, instructional
technologist at Trinity College. Other Trinity students who worked on an earlier phase
of this project were Ryan Butler, Molly Stumbras, and Ben Willig. Financial support
was provided by a one-year grant from the Faculty Research Committee and an UrbanGlobal Senior Project Grant, both at Trinity College.
1. In this study, all academic year data are stated by the end of the school year (i.e.,
1995–96 is reported as 1996) to make it more consistent with calendar year data.
2. A minor redistricting in fall 2000 affected approximately 50 students across three
elementary schools (Aiken, Bugbee, and Whiting Lane). Also, in 2005 a new middle
school was opened, though it used randomized lottery admissions rather than a neighborhood attendance area, so boundaries for all schools remained intact.
3. Only 3 percent (162 out of 4,734 total) of elementary students left a neighborhood
school to attend a West Hartford intradistrict magnet program, according to the 2004–5
Strategic School Profile. In that same year, an additional 1 percent (52 elementary
students) left to attend an interdistrict magnet school in Hartford as part of the Sheff
vs. O’Neill metropolitan desegregation remedy, according to 2004–5 data from the
Capitol Region Education Council.
4. The second generation CMT (offered each fall, from 1993–94 to 1999–2000)
and the third generation CMT (offered every fall, from 2000–3001 to 2004–5) were
relatively comparable, but the fourth generation CMT (offered every spring, beginning
in 2005–6) marked a significant departure from past practice.
5. Although a brief news story about West Hartford scores might appear in various
editions, a graphic featuring individual school results appeared only in the local edition
of the Hartford Courant on December 23, 1996, B3 (5E West Hartford/Farmington
Valley local news edition); December 23, 1997, B3 (5E local news edition); January 6,
1999, B1 (7 Hartford North final edition).
6. According to the Internet archive, http://www.archive.org, the original Web
site for the Connecticut Department of Education, http://www.state.ct.us/sde, was
launched in May 1996, with Strategic School Profiles added as a new feature most
likely in late 1997.
7. While our original sample of 11 elementary schools formed 28 common boundary areas (or neighborhoods), we omitted two of these due to their extremely small
geography, which eliminated 27 home sales from our total sample.
8. These data were obtained from the Town of West Hartford property records
database. Only “qualified” sales, a legally recognized sale between two parties, were
included.
9. Both the number of bathrooms and the number of bathrooms squared are
included as independent variables to capture the nonlinear (quadratic) relationship
between the number of bathrooms and house price, which has been identified in
prior studies.
10. School-level data were obtained from the Connecticut Department of Education,
Data and Research Web site, http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/cedar/index.htm.Ourtest
score variable was calculated from the average percentage of students meeting goal across
three separate tests, and it should not be confused with a different variable in the state
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database: the percentage of students meeting goal on all three tests. Using the percentage
of students meeting goal (rather than raw scores) allows us to blend data drawn from the
second and third generations of the CMT.
11. Since housing characteristics may be correlated with each other, including them as
independent variables may result in multicollinearity and insignificant coefficient estimates.
In this study, as in previous studies, with the exception of the number of bedrooms, the
coefficients on the housing characteristics are statistically significant. The coefficient on the
number of bedrooms is not biased; therefore, it was included in the model.
12. See Kane et al. (2005, n. 10), which distinguishes between the 2 percent housing
increase per 1 school-level standard deviation in test scores versus their more widely reported
finding of a 10 percent housing increase per 1 student-level standard deviation in test scores.
Bayer et al. (2007), Black (1999), and our study all report findings in school-level format.
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